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Abstract 
How do government policies and practices affect struggles over collective identity and struggles over 
land? Examining the interconnections among collective identity struggles, land struggles and state 
policies and practices in post-apartheid South Africa, this paper argues that the government's 
contradictory policies and ambivalent practices have aggravated collective struggles over the boundaries 
of belonging. Specifically, the differing definitions of community set forth in traditional leadership, land 
tenure and land restitution policies exacerbate existing divisions among ‘communities’ concurrently 
subject to these policies and create practical policy dilemmas for decision-makers. This paper illustrates 
the interplay between public policies and collective identity struggles through close examination of 
struggles among the Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe, a so-called traditional community. The Barokologadi 
case underscores the necessity of attending to these interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Questions of collective identity and belonging remain highly salient in contemporary South Africa 
long after apartheid's formal demise. Many black South Africans now are caught between laws, 
policies and practices regarding traditional leadership and land that privilege different conceptions 
of membership. On the one hand, the post-apartheid state has buttressed chiefly authority by 
retaining tribal authority structures, now termed ‘traditional communities’. In maintaining the 
apartheid linkage of custom, place and authority, traditional leadership policies subject people who 
live in so-called traditional communities to a form of separate and potentially unequal sub-national 
citizenship.1 On the other hand, post-apartheid land restitution laws and policies have underscored 
the importance of origin and ancestry by empowering those individuals whose ties to the collective 
predate dispossession. These contradictory policies and practices exacerbate tensions over 
collective identity and belonging. 
This paper examines the interconnections among struggles over land, struggles over collective 
identity, and state policies and practices through an in-depth study of the Barokologadi ba ga 
Maotwe of North West Province. This case is emblematic of communal membership politics in 
contemporary South Africa. The Barokologadi were forcibly relocated, have an apartheid-shaped 
traditional council structure, and have pursued a collective land restitution claim. Like many South 
Africans who experienced forced removal and have sought collective restitution, the Barokologadi 
are subject to both land reform and traditional leadership policies and must navigate the tensions 
between them. Close examination of this case therefore allows for deeper understanding of the 
stakes and dynamics of struggles over collective identity in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Building upon recent critiques of post-apartheid traditional leadership and land policy reforms, 
this paper deepens our understanding of the interaction between these policies and collective 
identity politics (see Ntsebeza 2005; Ntsebeza & Hall 2007; Claassens & Cousins 2008; Walker 
2008). Decision-makers confronted several vexing ‘policy dilemmas’ such as ‘how to confirm the 
rights of those with strong claims to land (for example as a result of original or continuous 
occupation) without rendering later arrivals insecure and vulnerable’ (Cousins 2008: 11). While 
traditional leaders lobbied decision-makers to preserve their authority, many activists and scholars 
advocated the transformation or elimination of state-supported chieftaincy (see Fortin 2010). In 
the face of these conflicting pressures, policymakers have leaned towards preserving chiefly 
authority. For example, although the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 (CLARA) claimed to 
‘provide for the democratic administration of communal land by communities’, this act would 
have allowed traditional leaders to retain influence over communal land by empowering traditional 
councils to administer this land (CLARA 2004: preface & 21(2–4); Claassens & Cousins 2008). 
Accentuating the continuities with apartheid practices, scholars have critiqued the government's 
approach to these policy domains, highlighted problems in policy implementation, proposed 
alternatives and participated in the successful legal challenge to CLARA. The particular 
contribution of this paper is its examination of the interplay between state policies and collective 
identity struggles. 
In exploring the interconnections between struggles over land and struggles over identity, this 
paper draws attention to the similarities between South African political dynamics and those 
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elsewhere on the African continent. Conflicts over access to, control over and ownership of valued 
land have served as a catalyst for membership struggles across Africa (Berry 2002; Peters 2004; 
Geschiere 2009). Many autochthonous and long-resident groups have attempted to exclude other 
residents from membership and access to resources by labelling them outsiders, settlers, squatters 
or migrants who are not proper ‘sons of the soil’ (Geschiere 2009). Some so-called outsiders, such 
as the Mandingo of Lofa, Liberia, have been resident for more than a century (Bøås 2012). Others 
are relatively recent arrivals as in the case of Ndebele and Shona who moved to Binga and Vumba 
in northern Zimbabwe during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dzingirai 2003). The Ndebele people 
subsequently were excluded from the Binga District CAMPFIRE programme because they were 
not seen as ‘bona fide residents’, while Gokwe North district councillors’ labelling of some Vumba 
settlers as ‘squatters’ both ‘undermine[d] their rights as civic citizens’ and ‘attacked their status 
and entitlements as ethnic subjects’ (Hammar 2002: 227; Dzingirai 2003: 452).2 The Binga, 
Vumba and Barokologadi disputes each concern communal belonging. In the Barokologadi case, 
however, membership struggles centre on long-time residents rather than recent arrivals. 
Communal membership matters. Discursive struggles over collective identity, membership and 
belonging are intertwined with struggles over decision-making and resources. People's acceptance 
within, or exclusion from, the community strongly influences whether their views and claims are 
taken seriously by the collective. Contending factions use public and private speech to demarcate 
the boundaries between insiders and outsiders, and these struggles over the boundaries of 
belonging have material consequences. Traditional leaders and community associations apply their 
understandings of membership in determining which people may participate in decision-making, 
who may have access to collective resources, and who may pursue membership-dependent 
opportunities. As Mamdani (2002: 505) wrote of citizenship, communal membership ‘does not 
entitle you to resources, [but] it entitles you to enter the struggle for resources’. 
Struggles over collective identity in South Africa and elsewhere are intertwined with struggles 
over authority (Boone 2007; Berry 2009). Several recent analyses have emphasised the 
negotiability, ambivalence and unsettled character of such struggles, of property and of authority 
(Moore 1998; Berry 2000; Lund 2008). Yet negotiability has limits, as Pauline Peters (2002) 
argues. States play an important role in establishing these limits as their selective recognition and 
enforcement of some claims and not others strongly influences how struggles over identity, 
property and authority play out. State recognition of communal tenure ‘consolidates local states’, 
thereby making sub-national citizenship highly consequential (Boone 2007: 578). In this context, 
‘membership in the local community is a legal status and a political identity – that is, as a relation 
to the state, rather than just a state of mind’. In South Africa, for example, residents of the former 
homelands often need letters ‘confirming that they are known and bona fide community members’ 
in order to obtain identity documents and to access government programmes (Claassens 2011: 11). 
The Barokologadi case brings the interconnections among struggles over belonging, resource 
struggles and the state to the fore. 
In focusing on collective identity, shared membership and belonging, this paper necessarily 
engages with the vexed concept of community. The word community evokes both geography and 
imaginary for, as Gupta & Ferguson (1992: 8) write, ‘notions of locality or community refer both 
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to a demarcated physical space and to clusters of interaction’. Although communities are often 
imagined as idyllic, harmonious, cohesive, homogeneous and timeless collectives independent of 
state and economy, actual communities comprise multiple, differently positioned actors with 
diverse and sometimes conflicting interests (Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Li 1996, 2002; Agrawal & 
Gibson 1999). Neither timeless nor autonomous, communities are formed and reshaped through 
discourse, social relations and material practices and by political, economic and social forces. This 
paper deepens our understanding of these processes through its description and analysis of the 
interplay between Barokologadi collective identity struggles and the South African government's 
land and traditional leadership policies and practices. 
This paper draws from field research among Barokologadi people in 2005, 2006 and 2010.3 My 
research methods were qualitative: I interviewed people, observed public and private meetings, 
engaged in informal conversations, and delved into public and private archives in North West and 
Gauteng provinces. I conducted 83 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with approximately 95 
people, interviewing 15 individuals both in 2005–6 and in 2010. I spoke with Barokologadi 
traditional leaders and land claim activists, self-identified Barokologadi youth, adults and elders, 
and non-Barokologadi subject to the Barokologadi Traditional Council along with government 
officials, lawyers, consultants and other people who interact with the Barokologadi.4 This paper 
focuses on identity struggles among self-identified Barokologadi, those people who saw 
themselves as Barokologadi and wanted to be accepted as such. My Barokologadi informants 
occupied a wide range of subject positions and had varied perspectives on the struggles this paper 
describes, but none advocated imposing Barokologadi-ness on people who do not identify as 
Barokologadi. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section describes differing 
conceptions of Barokologadi identity and situates these competing discourses in historical 
perspective. I then discuss South Africa's traditional leadership, land tenure and land restitution 
policies in the third section. The fourth section analyses how these policies have affected 
Barokologadi identity struggles. My analysis focuses on two recent controversies that illustrate the 
interplay between these struggles and state policies and practices. The conclusion considers the 
broader policy implications of this case. 
COMPETING IDENTITIES AND SELECTIVE HISTORIES: BAROKOLOGADI-NESS, 
PLACE AND ORIGIN 
As I talked with Barokologadi people in 2005, 2006 and 2010, I found them pulled between 
competing conceptions of collective identity. On the one hand, the Barokologadi kgosi (chief) 
articulated an expansive, place-focused understanding of Barokologadi-ness. ‘You are all 
Barokologadi no matter where you come from. Each of you staying here, you are a Morokologadi’, 
said Kgosi O.T.S. Maotwe at one 2006 community meeting in Pitsedisulejang (2.3.2006).5 On the 
other hand, T.Z. Molwantwa, the leading Barokologadi land restitution activist, talked of the 
‘people who joined our land’, implying that people who had settled in Barokologadi places were 
not truly Barokologadi (2006 int.).6 Addressing the issue more directly in a 2010 interview, 
Molwantwa told me, ‘I think people who are not beneficiaries of this land, who are not 
Barokologadi … by nature, who came to this site, are more than Barokologadi … they still have 
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allegiance to their chiefs where they come from.’ Other self-identified Barokologadi also 
expressed contrasting understandings of identity as the quotations below illustrate. 
For me, Barokologadi, those people were once a community in Melorane. And they were then scattered from Melorane 
… that core, and their descendants, are Barokologadi … you are born Morokologadi or you are married into 
Barokologadi … (Interview, Pretoria, 2010) 
I came to Kgosi Maotwe to ask for a stand, and he welcomed me, and I became a Morokologadi [in 1961]. You can't 
have two chiefs; it means you are not an honest person. … That is how I came here, and now I am a full member of 
the Barokologadi community, and I will never migrate to other places. As you can see, I have already built up a house 
here. Everything that affects Barokologadi also affects me. (Interview, Pitsedisulejang, 2006) 
‘For me, it [the Barokologadi community] is everybody who lives there. Those people may not have come from 
Melorane, but for them to end up at Debrak, they were personally removed from somewhere. … These are the people 
that every time a little contribution was made – to build a school, to build whatever – they were there as well, you 
understand … so how do we segregate now, you know?’ (Interview, Midrand, 2010) 
There is racism in our village. I am not a pure Morokologadi. The main Barokologadi have discrimination. They don't 
want to include us. (Interview, Pitsedisulejang, 2006) 
These public and private statements articulate competing conceptions of Barokologadi collective 
identity. For some, Barokologadi-ness is defined by ancestry and history, by one's ties to Melorane, 
the home place from which Barokologadi were forcibly removed in 1950. For those who adhere 
to this perspective, it makes no sense to talk of someone becoming Barokologadi. A person can 
only be Barokologadi if he (or she) can trace his membership in the community back multiple 
generations or can show that his lineage was part of the Barokologadi before they left Melorane. 
Others view residence in Barokologadi places and acceptance of Barokologadi customary 
authority as sufficient for full membership. If a person lives in a Barokologadi place, has joined 
the community in the way its traditions call for – namely marrying a Barokologadi person or 
obtaining permission from a Barokologadi clan, a clan leader, and the kgosi or tribal council and 
agreeing to obey the kgosi – then he or she is Barokologadi. From this perspective, one can become 
Barokologadi. 
These competing Barokologadi identity discourses display the troubled relationship with history 
that Geschiere (2009) argues characterise all autochthony discourses. Although adherents to each 
viewpoint depict Barokologadi identity and membership criteria as if they are clear, stable and 
unchanging, each discourse relies upon a partial recounting of Barokologadi history and a selective 
interpretation of its customs. As with many Southern African communities, the Barokologadi are 
a diverse group who have a complex history punctuated by coerced and voluntary relocations, 
fission, emigration and immigration. While the ultimate origin of the Barokologadi is unclear, the 
Barokologadi have had close ties with the Bakgatla and other Tswana groups since at least the 
17th century (Breutz 1953; Barokologadi Royal Council 2001). The Barokologadi resided with the 
Bakgatla ba ka Kgafela in the Transvaal village of Lengwana in the early 18th century and may 
have been subject to them. During the 19th century, the Barokologadi moved with the Bakgatla to 
Mankgodi in present-day Botswana and then separated from the Bakgatla and returned to the 
Transvaal in present-day South Africa. The Barokologadi then settled in Melorane under the 
leadership of Kgosi Sentswe Maotwe before the turn of the 20th century. 
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The Barokologadi also moved during the 20th century. The South African government did not 
recognise the Barokologadi as the owners of the land they called Melorane, and their occupation 
became increasingly insecure over time. The government declared the settlement a ‘black spot’ in 
1936, sold the land to white farmers in 1938, ordered the Barokologadi to leave the area in 1949, 
and then removed the people still resident in 1950. Legal efforts to challenge this forced removal 
were unsuccessful. 
These pressures produced fissures among the Barokologadi as four groups moved to different 
settlements in what was then Bophuthatswana and is now the North West province. The first two 
groups moved to private farms in the late 1940s as removal became imminent. Several 
Barokologadi families collectively purchased Debrak farm and relocated there despite the current 
kgosi's disapproval. This first group was led by Esser Mokgophe, whose family had been 
purchasing private farm land since the 1920s. A second group of Barokologadi moved to Motlollo 
(also called Spitskop), a private farm in the mountains where they lived independently for several 
decades before relocating to Obakeng in 1985 in order to secure access to pensions.7 Kgosi Olefile 
Maotwe and his remaining followers stayed at Melorane until they were forcibly removed to 
Misgund in 1950. As conditions there were very poor, this third group moved and fragmented once 
more. Some moved to the Davidskatnagel farming settlement on the advice of the Native 
Commissioner, and others founded the village of Pitsedisulejang along with the kgosi. Figure 1 
shows the location of Debrak, Obakeng, Davidskatnagel, Pitsedisulejang and other rural 
Barokologadi places. 
In addition to these large collective movements, individuals and small groups of people moved to 
and from Barokologadi places throughout the 20th century. Numerous self-identified 
Barokologadi recounted relocating from place to place, first with their parents or caregivers and 
then later as adults for educational and work opportunities. These individual and familial 
migrations occurred both before and after the community's coerced relocation: many people with 
ties to Melorane have settled near-permanently in townships, towns and cities that offer greater 
economic opportunities and place them outside traditional authority structures. Township 
associations, social networks and trips to Barokologadi places fostered a sense of collective 
identity among these Melorane Barokologadi. Concurrently, successive Barokologadi chiefs, 
headmen and clans in Davidskatnagel, Debrak, Motlollo/Obakeng and Pitsedisulejang have 
allowed people without ties to Melorane to settle in these places. Consequently, the Melorane 
Barokologadi have dispersed, and every Barokologadi place is now populated by individuals, 
families and households with diverse ancestral ties. 
This brief recounting of Barokologadi history shows the limitations of ancestry and Melorane-
focused articulations of collective identity. In arguing that people who were recognised as 
Barokologadi in the 1940s and their descendants are the only true Barokologadi, adherents to this 
perspective disregard the inherent arbitrariness of freezing membership in this dynamic, shifting 
collective at a single point in time. It is far from obvious why the descendants of people who settled 
in Melorane in the 1930s should be accepted as Barokologadi while those who settled in 
Pitsedisulejang or Davidskatnagel in the 1950s should not. This perspective also disregards long-
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established customary practices through which individuals and groups have left one community 
and joined another. 
Yet those who articulate a more inclusive, residence-focused approach to Barokologadi 
membership also draw selectively from customary practice. Schapera's (1970: 118) classic 
description of Tswana practice is consistent with numerous Barokologadi informants’ depiction of 
their customs. He wrote: ‘Membership of a tribe … is defined, not in terms of birth, but of 
allegiance to the chief. It is possible for people not born into a tribe to become subjects of its chief, 
either by conquest or by placing themselves voluntarily under his rule.’ Schapera's description of 
Tswana conceptions of membership emphasises the importance of allegiance. During colonialism, 
segregation and apartheid, however, customary practices were substantially transformed as chiefly 
authority became tied to specific territories rather than to people (Delius 2008). 
Place-based approaches to membership encounter few problems when place and allegiance 
coincide but have severe limitations when they do not. Apartheid and bantustan officials often 
granted traditional leaders authority over places where most people had no allegiance to these 
chiefs and little sense of membership in these ‘traditional communities’. This happened in the 
Barokologadi case. After Kgosi Olefile Maotwe and his followers settled in Pitsedisulejang, the 
Bophuthatswana government created the Barokologadi Tribal Authority and granted the chief 
jurisdiction over seven settlements in 1958 (Bophuthatswana 1958, 1959). The government's 
action gave the kgosi authority over Davidskatnagel and Debrak, which had had their own leaders, 
and extended his authority to four settlements that were not previously subject to the Barokologadi: 
Nkaipaa, Ramokgolela, Ramotlhajwe and Sesobe (shown in Figure 1). Obakeng was later placed 
under the formal jurisdiction of the Batlokwa Tribal Authority. 
The apartheid establishment of the Barokologadi Tribal Authority deepened existing fissures 
among the Barokologadi. Imposition of this authority not only was resisted by residents of the four 
non-Barokologadi localities but also was resented by many Barokologadi residents of 
Davidskatnagel and Debrak who had thought that these settlements would be independent of the 
chief. These tensions remained unresolved when I visited these settlements nearly 40 years later. 
Pitsedisulejang, the seat of the chieftaincy, was the only settlement in which most of my informants 
both identified as Barokologadi and accepted the legitimacy of Barokologadi Traditional Council 
governance. Most Davidskatnagel and Debrak informants identified as Barokologadi, but many 
expressed ambivalence towards the traditional council. In Nkaipaa, Ramokgolela, Ramotlhajwe 
and Sesobe, most people retained separate, non-Barokologadi identities, and some continued to 
protest their inclusion in the Barokologadi council while others accepted it. These dynamics 
highlight the problems inherent in a place-focused approach to communal identity. As the 
Barokologadi case illustrates, place-based approaches offers little guidance for defining the 
collective in places where state-recognised boundaries lack customary legitimacy. 
Kgosi O.T.S. Maotwe has tried to finesse these problems since his 2003 appointment. Despite his 
statement, ‘You are all Barokologadi’, the kgosi has used place-focused language selectively to 
welcome those who self-identify as Barokologadi while refraining from imposing a Barokologadi 
identity on his subjects in Nkaipaa, Ramokgolela, Ramotlhajwe and Sesobe. In response to 
requests for self-governance, Kgosi Maotwe has met with leaders in each subject locality, 
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permitted each village to establish separate financial accounts and advised those seeking 
independence to file petitions with the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and 
Claims as he lacks the power to decide this matter.8 
This brief discussion of identity discourse has shown that Barokologadi people disagree deeply on 
the boundaries of the collective. Some believe that origin is the fundamental determinant of 
Barokologadi-ness while others believe that residence and affiliation are sufficient. I have argued 
that both identity perspectives draw selectively from history and customs, highlighting certain 
events and practices while neglecting others, and that neither history nor custom offers solid 
grounds for adjudicating between these competing conceptions of Barokologadi identity. 
Discourse is an important arena in which collective identity struggles are carried out. Words and 
speech can be used to welcome people, inviting them to participate in community discussions and 
decisions. And language can exclude, marking certain individuals or groups as outsiders or 
marginal members. Several informants told me of community meetings in which ancestral 
Barokologadi asked those without such ties, ‘Who are you?’ In so doing, these individuals 
challenged place-Barokologadi's membership and questioned their right to participate in collective 
discussions and decisions. Discursive struggles are intertwined with conflicts over decision-
making, participation and material resources. But what does this have to do with state policies and 
practices? 
STATE POLICIES, STATE PRACTICES AND COMMUNAL IDENTITY 
Barokologadi identity conflicts do not manifest in isolation. State policies, practices and discourses 
shape the context in which these disputes occur. Traditional leadership, land tenure and land 
restitution have been important loci of struggle. Since South Africa's transition from apartheid 
began, chiefs, farmers' organisations, academics and land and gender rights activists have 
mobilised to shape policy in each area, often advocating radically different approaches (see 
Ntsebeza 2005; Oomen 2005; Fortin 2010; Kleinbooi 2012). The resultant policies reflect the 
difficult balancing act between transformational constitutional objectives and pragmatic political 
compromises. 
The Barokologadi are simultaneously subject to traditional leadership, land tenure and land 
restitution policies. State traditional leadership policies determine how the Barokologadi 
Traditional Council is organised and establish the scope of the Barokologadi ‘traditional 
community’. Land tenure policies establish the rights of people who reside on private and 
communal lands, implicitly defining a land-based Barokologadi community. And land restitution 
policies set up the process through which groups that were wrongfully deprived of their land can 
seek redress, thereby creating a Barokologadi claimant community represented by the 
Barokologadi Land Claims Committee and the Barokologadi Communal Property Association. As 
I will discuss, each policy domain supports a different conception of communal membership. 
These policies signal the state's ambivalence over the boundaries of belonging and provide identity 
activists with resources to employ in their struggles. 
Post-apartheid traditional leadership policies 
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Traditional leadership policies are meant to realise the South African constitution's recognition of 
traditional leadership, traditional authority and customary law without violating its bill of rights 
(Chapters 12 & 2). To date, post-apartheid traditional leadership laws and policies have built upon 
the apartheid framework rather than transforming it (c.f. Williams 2009).9 One of the most crucial 
continuities with apartheid is the linkage of communal membership with place of residence. The 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 (Sections 2(1) & 28(3–4)) not 
only defined all those subject to customary law as ‘traditional communities’ but also deemed all 
previously established ‘tribes’ and ‘tribal authorities’ to be ‘traditional communities’ and 
‘traditional councils’ and retained apartheid-era tribal boundaries. Although this act and provincial 
laws empower North West provincial premiers to modify traditional council boundaries and 
redefine traditional communities, few have exercised this authority. 
The traditional leadership act privileges a place-bound definition of membership. As Smith (2008: 
49) wrote of the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004, ‘In the Act's operationalizing mechanisms, 
the “community” is assumed. All persons living on land under the jurisdiction of a traditional 
council or apartheid-imposed tribal authority are regarded as being parts of the community for 
purposes of the Act.’ From the traditional leadership policy perspective then, all people residing 
in the seven Barokologadi Traditional Council villages are community members. 
Recognising that this approach directly conflicts with his ancestry-based understanding of 
community, Barokologadi land claims leader T.Z. Molwantwa testified in opposition to these 
aspects of the traditional leadership and communal land rights bills before their adoption (Madikwe 
Communities 2003; Molwantwa and Madikwe Council 2003; also see Molwantwa et al. 2010). 
Molwantwa argued that the Barokologadi Traditional Council was an apartheid creation that 
wrongly subjected communities on state land, communities on private land and communities 
without historical ties to the Barokologadi to its authority. Kgosi O.T.S. Maotwe has not defended 
the decidedly non-customary traditional council but instead has pressed for the full inclusion of all 
self-identified Barokologadi. 
Post-apartheid land tenure and land restitution policies 
The 1996 constitution obligates the state to redress the segregation and apartheid legacy of black 
tenure insecurity and racialised dispossession (Section 25). Post-apartheid governments have 
enacted several laws to improve tenure security and to provide for restitution including the 
Restitution of Land Act of 1994, the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act of 1996, and 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997. Tenure policy reforms have sought to increase 
security and to protect vulnerable populations by formally recognising communal land rights and 
management systems, articulating specific rights to which land occupants and informal land 
holders are entitled, and establishing that the right to residence can only be removed through 
processes that meet certain standards. 
The Interim Protection of Land Act of 1996 (1(a(ii))) defines a ‘community’ as ‘any group or 
portion of a group of persons whose rights to land are derived from shared rules determining access 
to land held in common by such group’. This definition recognises that a traditional council may 
encompass multiple communities who manage different parcels of land.10 This approach has three 
important implications for the Barokologadi. One, all people with long-term residential rights and 
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individual or shared access to agricultural land in Barokologadi places are members of the 
community; neither ancestry nor allegiance to the traditional leadership determine membership. 
Two, the Barokologadi Traditional Council likely comprises seven distinct communities as most 
land allocation and management decisions are made at the village level or by families. Three, no 
resident of a Barokologadi place (or any other communal area) can be arbitrarily deprived of his 
or her land rights.11 The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act was intended to serve as 
a temporary measure to prevent displacement; it remains to be seen whether subsequent land 
legislation will retain this definition of community.12 
South African land restitution policies support a different conception of community. The 
Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 established the process through which individuals and 
groups could seek redress for racialised dispossession. This act's definition of community is nearly 
identical to that provided in the interim land act.13 In its focus on claimant communities comprised 
of people who held rights in land that were governed by shared rules before dispossession, 
however, the restitution act inherently privileges origin and ancestry-based articulations of 
membership. From the perspective of restitution legislation, the Barokologadi community 
encompasses the people who lived together at Melorane and their descendants. These individuals 
are the only ones entitled to pursue this land claim and the only people who must share in its 
benefits. 
The Barokologadi land restitution claim 
The Barokologadi land restitution claim was initiated by T.Z. Molwantwa, who experienced the 
forced removal as a child and then became a land rights activist in adulthood. Molwantwa filed a 
collective land claim to Melorane on behalf of the Barokologadi on 2 July 1995. The Barokologadi 
claim encompassed more than 26,000 hectares of land including a portion of the Madikwe Game 
Reserve, a provincial game reserve and nature tourism destination, and land proximate to the 
Molatedi dam, which supplies water to Botswana and South Africa (see Figure 1). 
The South African Constitution and the Land Restitution Act mandate that dispossessed 
individuals and groups receive restitution, but they do not require restoration: redress may also 
take the form of financial compensation or provision of alternative land. In consequence, land 
claimants often have had to mobilise for restoration of land rights in the face of staunch opposition 
from affected landowners and land users. In the Barokologadi case, provincial officials and 
affected land users sought to retain their full access to and control over the high-value land 
Melorane had become. Many collective claims also have been complicated or delayed by 
interventions from traditional leaders who have tried to control the process or to claim land on 
behalf of subject communities, but this did not occur in the Barokologadi case.14 
Barokologadi activists engaged in a multi-pronged struggle for Melorane's restoration under the 
leadership of T.Z. Molwantwa. With assistance from the Legal Resources Centre and the Land 
Access Movement of South Africa, the land claims committee collected oral testimonies from 
elders, challenged the State Land Disposal Committee's recommendations and negotiated with the 
Land Claim Commissions and the North West Parks and Tourism Board. Activists also publicised 
their struggle by picketing outside Madikwe and participating in provincial and national land 
summits. 
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Activists emphasised the Barokologadi's shared history of struggle to strengthen the sense of 
community and collective identity among the dispersed claimants throughout the land claim 
process. The mobilisation spanned Gauteng and Mafikeng as well as Davidskatnagel, Debrak, 
Obakeng and Pitsedisulejang, and included both claimant and non-claimant Barokologadi in its 
early stages. ‘At the beginning, we went house to house and sought support’, one non-claimant 
Pitsedisulejang resident told me (22.2.2006 int.). ‘We even went with them to Melorane, 
participated in meetings in Obakeng’, said another (27.2.2006 int). Over time, however, some 
claimants drew increasingly stark distinctions between ‘pure Barokologadi’ or ‘Barokologadi by 
birth’ and ‘non-Barokologadi’ that led the non-claimant Barokologadi to withdraw from the 
struggle for Melorane. 
The Barokologadi's land claim was finally resolved in 2007, and the claimants now collectively 
hold title to most of Melorane through the communal property association created for that 
purpose.15 The claimants did not obtain unrestricted property rights, however. The Barokologadi 
cannot move back, farm or otherwise develop the land inside Madikwe Game Reserve in ways 
incompatible with conservation, and their rights to Molatedi Dam and the surrounding land are 
restricted by national water policies and international conventions.16 Because the claimants have 
chosen to pursue ecotourism and commercial agriculture on Sebele farm and the other land outside 
Madikwe, they also will not move back to that portion of Melorane to which they possess 
unrestricted rights. These circumstances make the government's commitment to support 
agricultural development, to provide development grants and to upgrade land tenure in the places 
where the Barokologadi claimants now live or use as part of the settlement particularly important. 
South African restitution policies mandate the inclusion of all dispossessed people and their 
descendants in land claims and communal property associations. Although these policies do not 
require the exclusion of non-claimants, the Barokologadi claimants have restricted membership in 
their communal property association to land claim beneficiaries and their spouses. This decision 
codified the ancestry-based conception of Barokologadi identity held by many land claimants but 
has also complicated efforts to upgrade land tenure in Davidskatnagel, Debrak, Obakeng and 
Pitsedisulejang as the association does not represent the many non-beneficiary residents of these 
places. 
STATE POLICIES AND COMMUNITY IDENTITY STRUGGLES 
Traditional leadership, land tenure and land restitution policies coincide at the community level, 
empowering two different subsets of self-identified Barokologadi. Traditional leadership policies 
and practices empower the chief, headmen and other members of the traditional council. As 
discussed, these policies support Kgosi Maotwe's stance that all people who live in Barokologadi 
places are Barokologadi. Land tenure policies recognise customary practices in a more nuanced 
manner that potentially empowers the not-so-traditional councils but also provides some protection 
for the most vulnerable residents of Barokologadi places. Land restitution policies empower the 
Barokologadi Communal Property Association and the Barokologadi it represents: those with 
familial connections to Melorane regardless of where they now reside. 
Over the last decade, the Barokologadi Traditional Council and the Barokologadi Communal 
Property Association (CPA) have served as the principal launching points for communal identity 
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struggles. State policies establish the basic framework through which each organisation operates. 
As national and provincial legislation dictates, the Barokologadi Traditional Council is governed 
by a council composed of several men who hold their position in accordance with custom – the 
kgosi, village headmen, and clan leaders and representatives – and several democratically elected 
male and female representatives; each village also has a similarly constituted sub-council.17 The 
Barokologadi CPA represents land claim beneficiaries and their spouses. The Barokologadi thus 
has two overlapping organisations that claim to represent and act on behalf of the community. 
Two recent incidents illustrate how identity conflicts manifest among the Barokologadi and enrol 
state officials. The first incident exemplifies attempts by some activists to impose a uniform, 
descent-based conception of membership on all Barokologadi places. Consistent with Kgosi 
Maotwe's place-focused conception of collective identity, the Barokologadi Traditional Council 
(BTC) contains several councillors with no ancestral connection to Melorane. Notably, these 
councillors are not drawn solely from the four villages with no pre-apartheid connection to the 
Barokologadi but also represent Pitsedisulejang, the seat of the chieftaincy. These place-
Barokologadi have been treated as equal members of the traditional council, and the kgosi 
sometimes has turned to them for advice. Deeply troubled by these practices, Barokologadi CPA 
leaders and others with strong commitments to an ancestry-based conception of identity have 
mobilised to express their discontent. 
In July 2004, dissatisfied Barokologadi led a mass action in Pitsedisulejang in which they marched 
to the tribal office and then presented a memorandum to the kgosi. Conflicting views regarding 
communal membership and governance were at the heart of this dispute. During the action, a 
spokesperson read a long list of demands which included the removal of two elected councillors 
from Pitsedisulejang (Barokologadi ba Maotwe Community Forum 2004). Both were long-time 
residents who lacked ties to Melorane.18 The memorandum stated in part, ‘Kgosi Thari should … 
regard his tribe as one among the first’, and instructed that the chief should rely upon his relatives 
and senior uncles rather than taking advice from other ‘fly-by-night types’. The spokesperson then 
went further, demanding that non-Barokologadi should go back where they came from. While the 
speaker clearly went beyond his mandate – CPA Chairperson T.Z. Molwantwa immediately arose 
to clarify that the demonstrators had not agreed that non-Barokologadi must leave – his impromptu 
addition made explicit the memorandum's underlying message that residents without ancestral ties 
were not community members in the protesters' eyes. 
BTC Chairperson Kgosi O.T.S. Maotwe did not accede to any of the demands regarding ‘non-
Barokologadi’ but instead called a community-wide meeting to discuss the demands. At that 
meeting, the kgosi reiterated his stance, declaring that each person residing in Pitsedisulejang was 
a Morokologadi, and refused to remove the two councillors with whom he indicated he had no 
problems. Because these individuals were elected by villagers, he stated, it was that community 
which must remove them. The kgosi and his advisers then moved to secure governmental support 
for their stance. They prepared a written response to the Barokologadi Community Forum 
memorandum and sent the draft response to the provincial Department of Traditional Affairs and 
the premier for review, thereby involving state officials in this collective identity conflict. After 
provincial officials had expressed approval of his response, the kgosi sent his reply to the 
protesters. The chairperson of the North West Province House of Traditional Leaders and other 
chiefs then came to the meeting at which the demand and response were to be discussed. Although 
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the meeting did not proceed as planned – the protesters refused to discuss their demands in the 
presence of individuals they had not invited – the conflict abated. In this case, the actions of 
provincial officials and non-Barokologadi traditional leaders served to reinforce the kgosi's 
authority and his place-based view of identity. 
A later incident drew in a different set of state actors whose stance regarding communal identity 
was far more ambiguous. In July 2008, Madikwe Game Reserve staff distributed an announcement 
inviting applications for a field guide training course. Designed to assist ‘previously disadvantaged 
South Africans, working or living in Madikwe Game Reserve or in villages in the immediate 
vicinity of the game reserve’, the programme would cover all expenses for successful applicants, 
provide each with a stipend during training, and then assist them to find employment at the game 
reserve. The announcement was sent to Pitsedisulejang and the other five villages situated closest 
to Madikwe.19 Sixty-six individuals from 13 villages around Madikwe submitted applications, 18 
applicants were shortlisted, and five villagers were selected. Of the 13 applicants from 
Pitsedisulejang, two were shortlisted, and both were chosen to participate in the programme. Both 
were place-Barokologadi. That is, they were born elsewhere, moved with their parents to 
Pitsedisulejang while in primary or middle school, and then became active participants in village 
affairs as adults. 
Shortly after the successful applicants arrived at the training site in Mpumalanga province, the two 
Pitsedisulejang trainees received phone calls informing them that the Barokologadi CPA had 
objected to their selection for this programme. The CPA challenged both the participants' 
eligibility and the process through which applicants were recruited. One unsuccessful applicant 
recalled the complainants saying, ‘Who are these people? We need our people to come. Bring 
those ladies home’ (Rametsi 2010 int.). In the eyes of the complainants, the Pitsedisulejang trainees 
were not Barokologadi because they lacked ancestral ties to Melorane. Procedural complaints 
concerned the decision to send the announcement only to the tribal office and the manner in which 
the announcement was circulated.20 The CPA chairman told me: 
I told them [Madikwe staff] … ‘Kgosi is the kgosi of everybody, not Barokologadi only. He's got other subjects who 
are staying in the villages. So you must contact us and get us informed so that we can inform our people. Because we 
are not only staying at PJ [Pitsedisulejang].’ People from Katnagel, Obakeng and Debrak started quizzing … ‘How 
was the choice done?’ If these people were taken from Barokologadi … we are not from one village, we are from four 
villages, and if really something has to come from Barokologadi, all the four villages must be consulted. … We said, 
‘they must come back. They are not representing Barokologadi’. (Molwantwa 2010 int.)21 
The chairperson's comments highlight the interplay between Barokologadi identity disputes, 
communal politics and state practice. Note that the chairperson identified the four settlements with 
ties to Melorane as the Barokologadi places. And Chairperson Molwantwa differentiated between 
Barokologadi and the kgosi's other subjects. The chairperson's comments place the Pitsedisulejang 
trainees outside the boundaries of belonging and re-inscribe the message that post-Melorane 
entrants will never be allowed to become Barokologadi. 
In directing, ‘you must contact us’, the chairperson also conveyed the Barokologadi CPA's efforts 
to position itself rather than the kgosi as the principal representative of the Barokologadi 
community. The Barokologadi CPA has a legal mandate to act on behalf of the claimants on land 
restitution matters. It is in this capacity that the CPA has negotiated with North West Parks and 
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Tourism Board principals to co-manage the portions of Madikwe Game Reserve to which the CPA 
holds title. 
But these are not the only matters on which the North West Parks and Tourism Board interacts 
with Barokologadi. Because Madikwe Game Reserve was created to generate economic activity 
in the surrounding region through a tripartite partnership between the parks and tourism board, 
local communities and private companies (Davies 1997), the board has an obligation to work with 
all people residing in the surrounding area and to facilitate local development. Since the 
Barokologadi CPA has chosen to exclude many residents of Barokologadi places, and the BTC 
territory more generally from its membership, its ability to speak on behalf of the Barokologadi 
community of place is limited. To the extent that the chief is ‘the kgosi of everybody’, he may be 
an appropriate liaison for Madikwe community development efforts. 
North West Parks and Tourism Board staff find it difficult to balance the competing imperatives 
to respect the Barokologadi CPA's particular entitlements as a land owner and to facilitate the 
inclusion and development of all people who live near Madikwe Game Reserve. Staff members 
told me that this incident was but one of many interactions between the Barokologadi CPA and 
the North West Parks and Tourism Board in which the CPA insisted that it must be notified or 
consulted and questioned the need to include the kgosi. One staff person stated, ‘Sometimes I find 
myself in a Catch-22 situation. Because if I talk with him [the kgosi] directly, the chairperson of 
Barokologadi CPA will say, “Why did you do that?” … I find myself in a very awkward situation’ 
(Chuma 2010 int.). While the field guide programme administrators gave only cursory 
consideration to the selection complaints (Van Hasselt int. 2010), the incident taught Madikwe 
reserve staff that the Barokologadi CPA leadership not only was more prone to express grievances 
but also had better access to senior board decision-makers.22 In this context, some staff were 
inclined to defer to the CPA when conflicts arose. 
The trainee controversy reinforced many Pitsedisulejang residents' sense of marginalisation and 
reminded them of other grievances. One resident told me, ‘I am not seeing myself as a 
Morokologadi … because these people of Barokologadi, they do have apartheid’ (10.6.2010 int.). 
She and other informants recounted that although place-Barokologadi's contributions to the land 
claim had been welcomed, the same contributors were referred to pejoratively as bafudugedi, 
‘people coming from different … villages’ once the claim was settled.23 
The 2004 mass action and the 2008 training selection controversy show how Barokologadi 
activists have attempted to alter communal governance and state practices in accordance with their 
understanding of identity. Although neither effort attained its stated objectives, both incidents 
reinforced a particular articulation of belonging in which all people without direct ties to Melorane 
were regarded as permanent outsiders in places they regarded as home. 
CONCLUSION: MEMBERSHIP CONTROVERSIES AND POLICY QUANDARIES 
Struggles over communal membership and belonging are material as well as discursive. 
Communal identity struggles not only shape whether individuals feel accepted and whether they 
can participate in collective bodies but also affect whether they have access to communal 
resources. Land is one of the most crucial collective resources in South African communal areas, 
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and access to land often is dependent on membership. Indeed, Okoth-Ogendo (2008: 100) argues, 
‘access to land is essentially a function of membership in the family, lineage, or community, and 
is available to any individual on account of that membership’. 
The Barokologadi case illustrates the practical policy dilemmas that communal identity conflicts 
may create. The Barokologadi land restitution claim arose from their wrongful dispossession. In 
settling this claim, the government agreed to restore the Barokologadi's rights to Melorane and to 
protect them from future dispossession by obligating the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform to ‘upgrade tenure on land currently occupied and used by the claimant’ 
(Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 2007). This charge most directly concerns the four 
rural localities in which Barokologadi people settled after forced removal – Davidskatnagel, 
Debrak, Obakeng and Pitsedisulejang – and the associated farming areas. Yet Barokologadi 
identity conflicts create a practical dilemma for government officials: how can they carry out this 
duty without compromising the tenure security of residents who are not CPA members? Rural 
Development officials also have a duty to help realise the constitutional imperative to provide all 
people whose tenure ‘is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices’ 
with secure tenure or redress (Section 25(6)). This group includes all residents of the four principal 
Barokologadi places. Because past policies did not adequately recognise black people's rights to 
communal lands such as Davidskatnagel, Obakeng and Pitsedisulejang or to privately purchased 
farms such as Debrak, every person who lives in these localities lacks tenure security. All four 
localities contain numerous place-Barokologadi who were born in the settlements, have married 
residents, or have joined the community in accordance with contemporary practice and identify as 
Barokologadi. 
The disjunction between place and origin-based views of communal membership presents 
policymakers with a quandary. All place-Barokologadi qualify as community members from the 
perspective of land tenure and traditional leadership legislation, and they are viewed as community 
members by the Barokologadi chief. These residents comprise a substantial proportion of each 
locality's population and have land rights that should be rendered more secure. However, many 
place-Barokologadi are ineligible for Barokologadi CPA membership because they lack ties to 
Melorane. One civil servant concisely outlined the problem as follows: 
Barokologadi is a mixed tribe. What happens to the rights of non-beneficiaries in terms of the settlement, as those are 
people who invested their resources, built houses? They enjoy the same rights. … Ultimately, development should 
come for everyone. We don't want to create a situation where people are separate. We don't want to be at the head of 
the conflict that might occur. (2010 int.) 
There are no obvious solutions. Any attempt to upgrade tenure by transferring title to the 
Barokologadi CPA would disfranchise many residents and might compromise their tenure 
security. It also would empower non-resident ancestral Barokologadi to make decisions about the 
use of this land. Transferring title to the Barokologadi Traditional Council would present a host of 
complex problems. Traditional institutions are not only non-customary but also are less than fully 
democratic and often have failed to provide rural women with secure tenure (on gender see Meer 
1997; Claassens & Ngubane 2008). The approach that land scholar Ben Cousins (2007: 309) 
advocates also appears infeasible. In an effort to move ‘beyond the “customs versus rights” 
polarity’, Cousins proposes that policymakers ‘confer property rights on individuals rather than 
collectivities’, make ‘socially legitimate existing occupation and use … the primary basis for legal 
15 
 
recognition’, and rely upon ‘socially legitimate practice’ to determine social boundaries. In the 
Barokologadi case and many others, however, social legitimacy and social boundaries are 
precisely the problem. Social practice offers little guidance in the face of profound disagreement 
over the boundaries of belonging. 
This paper has demonstrated that the post-apartheid South African state's contradictory policies 
and ambivalent practices have aggravated Barokologadi identity struggles. While Barokologadi 
identity conflicts are rooted in that group's particular history of relocation, dispossession and 
fission, they are far from unique. Many communities are divided by struggles over land and the 
boundaries of communal belonging. While conscientious state officials have attempted to avoid 
doing additional harm by deferring action on land tenure, inaction is a deeply unsatisfactory long-
term strategy. The government should no longer attempt to circumvent the vexed questions of 
communal membership and belonging. 
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• Refiloe Zipporan Chuma, Madikwe Game Reserve official, Madikwe Game Reserve, 22.6.2010. 
• Rapoodile Nelson Makganye, Pitsedisulejang, 28.2.2006. 
• Tsholofelo Zebulon Molwantwa, Barokologadi Communal Property Association Chair, Krugersdorp, 
8.2.2006 & Sebele farm, 22.6.2010. 
• Nicolus William Rametsi, Pitsedisulejang, 22.2.2006 and 19.6.2010. 
• Resident, Pitsedisulejang, 10.6.2010. 
• Department of Rural Development official, Johannesburg, 7.7.2010. 
• Barokologadi person, Pretoria, 27.6.2010. 
• Barokologadi person, Midrand, 7.7.2010. 
• Lindy Rodwell Van Hasselt, Madikwe field guide program manager, Johannesburg, 7.7.2010. 
NOTES 
1.I use the term ‘traditional’ throughout this paper in references to state-recognised chiefs, regents, headmen, and 
authority structures as is common practice in South Africa. However, these institutions are far from traditional in the 
ordinary language meaning of the word. Subsequent sections discuss the decidedly non-customary changes to 
Barokologadi governance structures. I draw the term ‘sub-national citizenship’ from Boone (2007). 
2.CAMPFIRE allows district councils and communities to benefit from local natural resources. Recognised Binga 
residents could participate in training programmes, and received game meat, crop protection, and a small share of 
hunting concession revenue. 
3.I conducted field research in Davidskatnagel, Debrak, Madikwe Game Reserve, Obakeng, Nkaipaa, Pitsedisulejang, 
Ramotlhajwe and Sebele farm in North West Province and Krugersdorp, Johannesburg, Midrand, Pretoria, 
Rustenburg, Soweto and Tlhabane in Gauteng Province between December 2005 and June 2006 and in June and July 
of 2010. 
4.As will be discussed, Barokologadi authority was imposed upon other groups during apartheid. Very few of the 
affected people now identify as Barokologadi. 
5. Morokologadi and Barokologadi are the singular and plural forms of the same Setswana word; one community 
member is a Morokologadi, and two or more are Barokologadi. 
6.Mr Molwantwa was a member of the Transvaal Land Restoration Committee, co-founded the Land Access 
Movement of South Africa (LAMOSA), and has participated in national and provincial land summits. Mr. Molwantwa 
maintains ties with Barokologadi throughout South Africa and has helped to keep Barokologadi informed of relevant 
public policy developments. 
7.Bophuthatswana officials refused to provide pensions as long as the group lived on private land outside the 
jurisdiction of a state-recognised traditional leader. 
8.Separate accounts provide the settlements with greater autonomy while they await action from the Commission. 
Several informants asserted that their villages had not benefited from the tribal levies they were forced to pay during 
apartheid. Although the North West Provincial Parliament passed legislation in 2005 that forbade traditional councils 
from imposing levies without first obtaining the consent of community members at the kgotla or by canvassing all 
members, Claassens (2011) argues that there has been a recent ‘resurgence’ of levies across the former homelands. 
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act authorises the Commission on Traditional Leadership 
Disputes and Claims to decide traditional authority boundary disputes. Both this act and provincial legislation also 
empower the North West provincial premier to modify the boundaries of traditional authorities, but none of the 
premiers to date have redefined the Barokologadi authority despite repeated requests to do so. 
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9.See Ntsebeza (2005) and Oomen (2005) for contrasting explanations of why South Africa's traditional leadership 
reforms were so limited. 
10.I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this. 
11.The act permits the removal of an individual's informal rights to communal land but requires that these decisions be 
taken by majority rule at public meetings for which the affected individuals have been given proper notice and had a 
‘reasonable opportunity’ to participate (Section 2(4)). 
12.Initially intended to be in force only until 31 December 1997, the interim land act has been repeatedly extended in 
the absence of other legislation. Litigation first prevented the implementation of the Communal Land Rights Act of 
2004 and then led to its invalidation in 2010. 
13.Chapter 1 section 1 of the Restitution Act states, ‘“community” means any group of persons whose rights in land 
are derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such group, and includes part of any such 
group’. 
14.The land claim committee and the communal property association each recognised the Barokologadi traditional 
leader as an ex officio member but did not otherwise defer to this official. Neither Regent Moses Mmusi Maotwe 
(1998–2002) nor Kgosi O.T.S. Maotwe (2003–present) challenged the land claim, questioned the land claim 
committee's authority, or sought to lead the claim. Only 16 years old when the claim was first filed, O.T.S. Maotwe 
remained minimally involved after his appointment to the chieftaincy. Mmusi Maotwe became an active member of 
the Barokologadi CPA after his regency ended. 
15.The Barokologadi CPA had obtained title deeds to eight of the nine farms included in the settlement as of June 2010. 
16.Claimant households were granted 10,000 rand as partial compensation for this loss of occupation and use rights. 
17.Contemporary understandings of Tswana custom are patriarchal: although women sometimes serve as chiefs, village 
leaders and clan leaders, men generally are seen as the customary leaders (Schapera 1970; Tlou 1974; Ntshabele 
2006). 
18.One councillor settled in Pitsedisulejang in 1958, and the other moved to Pitsedisulejang in 1974. 
19.Course organisers separately recruited and selected seven individuals already employed at Madikwe Game Reserve. 
20.Although some alleged that the training opportunity had not been widely advertised, other informants told me that 
notices had been given to youth and posted at the tribal office and at village shops. 
21.Three applicants from the Barokologadi village of Obakeng also were shortlisted, and one was selected as a trainee. 
22.The Pitsedisulejang trainees clearly satisfied the stated eligibility criteria: they lived near Madikwe. Because the 
field guide initiative was privately funded and administered, programme decision-makers were insulated from the 
political pressures North West Parks and Tourism Board officials experienced. 
23.Several informants made this assertion in 2006 and 2010. A Setswana term for people who are not the original 
inhabitants of a place or members of a community, informants always understood bafudugedi to be insulting. 
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